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Abstract: Australia is an energy net self-sufficient country rich in energy resources, from fossil-based
to renewable energy. Australia, a huge continent with low population density, has witnessed
impressive reduction in energy consumption in various sectors of activity in recent years. Currently,
coal and natural gas are two of Australia’s major export earners, yet its abundant renewable energy
resources such as solar, wind, and tidal, are still underutilized. The majority of Asian countries,
on the other hand, are in the middle of economic expansion, with increasing energy consumption
and lack of energy resources or lack of energy exploration capability becoming a serious challenge.
Electricity interconnection linking two or more independent grids within a country or at cross-border
or regional levels has found its way into electricity markets worldwide. This concept allows for
electricity exchanges that lead to optimized use and sharing of electricity generated from different
sources. The interconnection also enables the long distance exploitation of renewable energy which
would otherwise be physically impossible. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and
other regional groupings in Asia have initiated a number of interconnections to gain economic
benefits. Asian’s hunger for energy for its economic development, climate change that has become
a global and urgent issue to be solved, and Australia’s abundant renewable energy resources have
all prompted increasing interest in a super-grid interconnection linking Australia to Asian grids,
the Australian–Asian (Power) Grid (AAG). This paper overviews the existing grid interconnections as
well as current initiatives at domestic, sub-regional, and regional levels worldwide, with a particular
focus on Asia. The paper concludes with a critical appraisal on the benefits, potential, challenges and
issues to be encountered by the AAG initiative.
Keywords: Australian—Asian grid; ASEAN; renewable energy; energy policy; grid interconnection;
HVDC
Energies 2018, 11, 200; doi:10.3390/en11010200 www.mdpi.com/journal/energies
Energies 2018, 11, 200 2 of 23
1. Introduction
Energy plays a central role in human development and improved quality of life. Society in the
developed world has now become so dependent on energy provision that any sort of energy shortage
or the total lack of it will create chaos or at least temporary panic. People’s lifestyles are very much
shaped by the easy provision of modern energy—mainly in the form of electricity—that powers their
appliances, buildings and industries. The lack of it is becoming increasingly parallel to the lack of
fresh air which can lead to physical harm or even fatality. Real examples include impacts of the recent
blackouts in South Australia [1,2] where power shortfalls were experienced by significant number of
customers, and the deaths of a number of people due to an historically long heatwave [3].
A review of the past blackouts reveals large costs to the society from the generated economic
impacts, social impacts, impacts on the power system per se, and impacts on other critical infrastructure
sectors [4]. The vulnerability of electricity supply was clearly exposed with widespread power outages
or failures in more than a decade ago across the UK, Italy, and North America. Supply side failures
also led to rolling blackouts, voltage reductions, and public appeals for emergency conservation in
California, Ontario, Chile, New Zealand, Brazil, and India, with major network failures in the Eastern
and Western U.S. and Italy causing significant socio-economic disruptions [5]. The blackout in Darwin
in 2014 is another example where the business sectors such as tourism experienced impacts in the form
of financial loss.
In modern society, energy has become a means for attaining comforts of life in various forms:
thermal comfort, visual comfort, instant communication, instant food preparation, comfortable travel,
etc. In the developing world, energy provision and availability mean a vehicle for achieving reasonable
livelihoods. Viewed from this viewpoint, energy is a means for improving the quality of livelihoods
through its use in various economic activities: from helping women in rural areas to reducing their
reliance on manual activities to the provision of better educational materials to their children through
distance learning through media powered by electricity. Even simple electric lighting for evening
study and economic activity is an important aid to education that is easily taken for granted by those
who have it. In a nutshell, “energy is vital for eradicating poverty, improving human welfare and
rising living standards.” [6].
“Electricity particularly is an important and sometimes irreplaceable input to modern productive
activities, dissemination of information and other services industries.” (id., p. 879).
Asia, the largest and most populous continent on Earth, consists of countries and groupings
of countries with diverse economic, political, social, and development status. Japan, an East Asia
industrialized nation, relies on imported fossil fuel (LNG, coal and oil) for its domestic consumption [7].
It also had 54 nuclear plants operating in 2010 that met 31.5 percent of the national electricity demand
although the operation of the nuclear plants ceased after the Fukushima disaster in 2011. China,
the world most populous country, has been experiencing consistently high economic growth in
recent decades, resulting in rapidly growing energy demand, and the renewal and expansion of
electricity generation, and transmission infrastructure. China’s fossil fuel, nuclear, and renewable
energy resources have consequently been developed at a world-leading pace. India and ASEAN
countries are expected to have accelerated increase in energy consumption due to their significant
growth potential in the future. Nonetheless, there is an urgent need for innovative ways to generate
power in socially, economically, and environmentally sustainable ways in Asia with energy demand
projected to almost double in Asia due to economic growth and growing population.
Australia finds itself at an historical turning point, accidentally finding itself adjacent to the center
of global economic activity after two centuries of neo-European political and economic development.
With its major trading partners now in Asia and a diverse population creating cultural ties and an
outwards perspective, Australia is in the process of broadening its loyalties and priorities and shaping
its Asia Pacific if not South East Asian identity. With declining electricity demand due to a combination
of energy efficiency, greater focus on service over manufacturing industries, and the rapid uptake of
residential solar energy (the largest single installed base of residential solar in the world at over 6 GW
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and 1.5 million residential rooftops), Australia exemplifies the issues facing a mature industrialized
nation and has a respite from growing its generation fleet that may allow it to reshape its energy mix.
This paper presents a critical appraisal of the prospect for an Australian–Asian electricity super
grid—an inter-continental connection of electrical power grids between Australia and Asia. The paper
begins with an overview of Asia’s energy situations followed by a discussion on global experience in
grid interconnections. Thereafter, the paper presents an overview of the ASEAN power grid which
will play a crucial role should the AAG initiative eventuate. Finally, the paper presents some general
policy issues and challenges in both Australia and ASEAN/Asian that need to be considered and
resolved to enable this initiative to come to fruition.
2. Asian Countries Energy Indicators—An Overview
To properly understand the relevance of the AAG, this section presents an overview of the energy
situations in Asian countries. As shown in Table 1 [8,9], energy use per capita of Asian countries
ranges from those below threshold levels suggested by the International Energy Agency (IEA) to those
on par with the other developed countries. According to the IEA [8], the threshold level is 250 kWh
per annum for rural areas and 500 kWh per annum for urban households. Such very low threshold
levels are clearly too low. The figures clearly show the huge disparity of access to electricity between
developing and developed worlds. This disparity is also reflected in the greenhouse gas emission
(GHG) per capita of the respective countries.
The table also shows that the number of people relying on the threshold level of electricity
consumption far outweighs the total population with significantly higher electrical consumption.
Another important figure that emerges from the table is the fact that the majority of Asian countries
have electricity access rate far below those of the OECD countries with only a handful of exceptions
such as Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, two of Asia’s rich countries with a very low population,
and Vietnam.
It is also worth looking at the status of trading status of the main fuel sources the Asian countries
rely on: petroleum, natural gas and coal. The majority of these countries rely on petrol imports to fulfill
their conventional fuel demands. This is not a sustainable situation given the constantly increasing
demand for these finite conventional fuel sources.
In conclusion, energy provision, adequacy, security, exploitation and distribution are still big
issues being faced by most of Asian countries.
Australia, on the other hand, is a country rich in energy resources such as coal (black and
brown) and gas (conventional and unconventional), oil (crude oil, condensate and unconventional
oil), and uranium and thorium (Table 2), but with a low population. In addition, Australia also has
abundant renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, tidal, and hydro. Energy exports were about
two thirds of production in 2015–2016 [10] which positions Australia as a very potential supplier
of energy required to sustain or even boost Asia’s economic growths. The Asia pacific regions
exhibit the potential to benefit from increased cross-border energy cooperation and trade by utilizing
complementarities in energy demand variations, diversity in energy resource endowments, and gains
from larger market access.
In addition to hydro energy, Australia’s main renewable resources (among the best in the world)
include solar and wind energy, wave, tidal, and geothermal resources. In terms of production however,
renewable energy accounts for only about 2% of total energy production, but 15% of electricity
generation [10]. The share of renewable electricity generation increased by 17% from 2015 to 2016,
reflecting increased hydro dam levels, continued investment in wind and rooftop solar generation,
and the start of production from the first large-scale solar farms.
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Table 1. Energy Indicators of Asian and several OECD countries [8,9].
Country Population (Million) Regional/OtherGrouping
Electrical Energy Consumption
(kWh Per Capita)
GHGE */Capita
in 2010
Net Export ***
2009 2010 2011 Petroleum BPD ** Natural Gas (billion m3) Coal (Metric Tons)
Electricity Access
Rate (%)—2014
Myanmar 52.8 ASEAN 97 121 110 0.2 −6.53 8.47 0 52.0
Cambodia 14.86 ASEAN 127 144 164 0.3 −43.3 0 −0.06 56.1
Bangladesh 154.7 SAARC 221 247 259 0.4 −108.2 0 −1.0 62.4
Pakistan 179.2 SAARC 450 458 449 0.9 −372.4 0 −3.27 97.5
Sri Lanka 20.33 SAARC 417 449 490 0.6 −92.4 0 −0.96 92.2
Philippines 96.71 ASEAN 592 641 647 0.9 −277.0 0 −9.12 89.1
Indonesia 246.9 ASEAN 592 634 680 1.8 −615.7 34.84 382.6 97.0
India 1237 SAARC 605 641 684 1.7 −2631.6 −16.9 −86.1 79.2
North Korea 24.76 - 730 744 739 2.9 −14.89 0 10.72 32.4
Vietnam 88.78 ASEAN 917 1035 1073 1.7 −24.34 0 17.8 99.2
Uzbekistan 29.78 - 1638 1648 1626 3.7 −3.44 10.2 −0.061 100
Kyrgyz Republic 5.58 ECO, CIS 1261 1339 1642 1.2 −34.26 −0.42 −1.1 99.8
Azerbaijan 9.30 CIS 1620 1603 1705 5.1 846.56 6.84 0 100
Tajikistan 8.00 CIS 1807 1808 1714 0.4 −14.2 −0.19 −0.013 100
Thailand 66.79 ASEAN 2120 2335 2316 4.4 −543.73 −9.57 −16.9 100
China 1351 - 2633 2944 3298 6.2 −5904.38 −38.8 −275.13 100
Malaysia 29.24 ASEAN 3934 4136 4246 7.7 44.66 30.38 −21.6 100
United Kingdom 62.23 OECD 5647 5702 5472 7.9 −494.11 −37.12 −44.0 100
Netherlands 16.4 OECD 6896 7010 7036 11 −960.63 34.32 −10.56 100
Germany 81.89 OECD 6753 7162 7081 9.1 −2218.85 −69.08 −47.9 100
France 65.7 OECD 7340 7735 7289 5.6 −1667.5 −42.74 −16.61 100
Japan 127.6 OECD 7838 8378 7848 9.2 −4590.83 −121.61 −183.1 100
Singapore 5.312 ASEAN 7896 8438 8404 2.7 −1359.83 −9.38 0 100
Brunei Darussalam 0.412 ASEAN 8605 8548 8507 22.9 144.05 9.04 0 100
South Korea 50 OECD 8900 9744 10,162 11.5 −2240 −47.8 −123.1 100
Australia 22.68 OECD 10,792 10,740 10,712 16.9 −607 21.2 301.5 100
United States 313.9 OECD 12,914 13,395 13,246 17.6 −7380.64 −43.01 105.62 100
* GHGE—greenhouse has emission, ** BPD = barrels per day *** Negative value means net import.
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Table 2. Australia’s Economic Demonstrated Resources (EDR) * as of December 2012 [11].
Energy Resource Economic Demonstrated Resources (PJ)
Black coal 1,641,863
Conventional gas 109,433
Coal seam gas 35,905
Crude oil 7382
Condensate 15,972
LPG 5664
Uranium 657,440
* Defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics as “a measure of the resources that are established, analytically
demonstrated or assumed with reasonable certainty to be profitable for extraction or production under defined
investment assumptions.”
3. Existing Grid Interconnections Worldwide—An Overview
3.1. The Global Power Grid “Dream”
The Global Power Grid “Dream” was initially coined by Dr. R. Buckminster Fuller—a
futurist—who envisioned a global energy grid with renewable energy being the backbone [12].
While this idea sounds unrealistic, its seed has already been planted in the forms of concepts or
implementations at smaller scales through sub-regional, regional, and intercontinental interconnections.
Notably in the Asian region, China has adopted Global Energy Interconnection as a policy response to
the triple threats of climate change, pollution, and resource constraints, announced by President Xi
Jinping at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in 2015. Accompanied by a China-centric vision
of the development pathway, to which alternatives may be proposed, this lifts the conversation about
a global power grid beyond theory into politics and practicality [13].
3.2. Domestic Interconnections
3.2.1. Basslink
Basslink [14,15], SAPEI (Sardegna Peninsola Italy) [16] and Java—Sumatera [17] interconnection
projects are examples of interconnections at the domestic levels which can be considered a technological
template for cross-border or even intercontinental interconnection. (The term “technological template”
here refers to technical or technological form or example that already exists on which structure or
configuration of future systems can be based.) Basslink is an undersea high voltage direct current
(HVDC) interconnection that facilitates electricity exchanges between Australian mainland and the
island of Tasmania. It has a 290 km long HVDC cable with a 400 kV rated direct current (DC) voltage
and DC current of 1250 A [14] capable of transmitting “500 megawatts (MW) of energy on a continuous
basis in either direction and up to 630 MW export from Tasmania for limited periods.” [18]. The project,
which commenced in 1997 and was finalized in 2004, came into operation with a total cost of A$874
million, a $250 million increase from the initial estimate due largely to a requirement for a return
conductor instead of the sea return originally planned [19]. Basslink was sold for A$1.2 billion in 2007,
emphasizing the attractiveness to international investors of transmission infrastructure projects that
maintain value over a design life of 40 years or more.
3.2.2. Sumatra—Java Interconnection (ISJ—Interkoneksi Sumatera Jawa)
The Sumatra–Java interconnection is a project planned to connect mine-mouth coal-fired power
plants being constructed in Bangko Tengah (South Sumatera) and the load centre in Java, Indonesia.
This project will supply 3000 MW electric power from South Sumatera steam power plant of an
Independent Power Producer (IPP, private electric power plant) to the Sumatera and Java system.
The total length of ISJ HVDC Transmission is 742 km which consists of 464 km DC transmission and
278 km alternating current (AC) transmission [20]. Upon completion, this will be Indonesia’s first
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electricity transmission system utilizing HVDC Technology and will aim at: (1) increasing the capacity
and reliability of power supply in Sumatera and Java; (2) supporting the Indonesian government’s
program of energy diversification by optimal utilization of abundant coal in Sumatra; (3) increasing
the electrification ratio in Sumatra and Java; (4) boosting national economic growth [17]. In Section 5
the transmission path of the ISJ [21] in the wider context of proposed international networks is shown
on a map. This project is being “temporarily postponed” [21].
3.3. Cross Border (Sub-Regional) Interconnections
At cross-border level, interconnections between the electrical grids of Italy and France, Denmark
and Norway, Poland and Sweden, Thailand and Malaysia, and Norway and the Netherlands are
existing real examples. Some are overland and some are submarine.
3.3.1. SAPEI
SAPEI is a submarine HVDC interconnector of ±500 kV with an exchange capacity of 1000 MW
HVDC that links Sardinia Island and the Italian Peninsula. The SAPEI “connects the 380 kV Fiume
Santo station located in the North-Western part of Sardinia, to the 380 kV Latina station located South
of Rome, with both ends being able to be connected to the local AC system without any network
reinforcements” ([16], p. 2). SAPEI was commissioned in 2011 [22] and improves the security of supply
in Sardinia. It also enables export from the island and as such it enables a significant pipeline of wind
generation projects. As such, and like many interconnectors, it is a good example of a business case
built on multiple benefits. It also establishes an important technical precedent by reaching a depth of
1650 m, the deepest interconnector in the world, signaling a future where intercontinental submarine
transmission will be achieved. SAPEI upgrades an older project, the SACOI link via Corsica that has
been operating since 1967 under the Italy’s electric utility company, ENEL [23,24].
3.3.2. Mainland French—Italian Mainland Interconnections
On Italy’s mainland, there are three Italian–French interconnections, i.e., two 400 kV
Rondissone–Albertville lines (1985), one 220 kV Camporosso–Trinite Victor line (1973) and one 400 kV
Venaus–Villarodin line (1969) [25]. A new interconnection between Piedmont and Savoy started
operation in 2013 with 190 km of DC extra-high voltage underground cable, increasing the electricity
exchange capacity up 1200 MW [26].
3.3.3. Denmark (Tjele)–Norway (Kristiansand)
Norway has abundant hydropower resources and its hydropower reservoirs make up nearly half
of Europe’s energy storage capacity. On the other hand, Denmark relies on wind and thermal power
for its electricity. The Cross-Skagerrak interconnection—owned and operated by Statnett (Norway)
and Energinet.dk (Denmark) facilitates electricity exchange between Tjele (Denmark) and Kristiansand
(Norway). The exchange enables Denmark to store excess wind energy it produces in the reservoir,
and imports it back when needed. With the recent commissioning of the Skagerrak 4 with exchange
capacity of 700 MW, the total capacity of Tjele–Kristiansand is 1700 MW [27,28].
3.3.4. Sweden Links with Finland, Germany and Poland
Sweden has DC interconnectors linking it to Finland, Germany and Poland [29]. Sweden’s
interconnection with the Finland was initiated at the end of the 1950s and indeed Sweden pioneered
DC transmission technology at this time. In the 1970s Northern Finland and Sweden were connected
through the construction of two 400 kV AC links [30].
Fenno-Skan 1, the first 500 MW HVDC submarine cable interconnection in the Gulf of Bothnia
commenced commercial operation in December 1989. It was then the world’s longest submarine
cable interconnection with the highest voltage and capacity. The electricity market liberalization that
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followed has enabled interconnections to take full advantage of the well-functioning Nordic electricity
market. The full capacity of the Fenno-Skan 1 link has been in use as a result of increased electricity
use [30].
Fenno-Skan 1 operation was followed by the construction of Fenno-Skan-2 consisting of 200 km of
submarine cable and 100 km of overhead cable with 800 MW exchange capacity. The new link,
operational since December 2011 and run by Svenska Kraftnät and Fingrid Oyj, was aimed to
“strengthen the existing DC link between Finnböle (Sweden) and Rauma (Finland)” [29].
The interconnection between Sweden and Germany was realized in 1991 through BalticCable
link, a 600 MW submarine HVDC cable connecting Trelleborg (Sweden) and Lübeck (Germany). The
interconnection is owned and operated by Baltic Cable AB [29].
The SwePol link is an interconnection between the Stärnö peninsula (Sweden) and Bruskowo
Wielkie (Poland) and consists of 250 km of HVDC submarine cable which became operational in
2000 [29].
3.3.5. Norway–Nederland (NorNed)
NorNed is a grid interconnection between Norway and the Netherlands with an electricity
exchange capacity of 700 MW through 580 km of HVDC submarine cable. It has been operational
since May 2008 and owned (in equal share) by TenneT (The Netherlands) and Statnett (Norway).
The interconnection enables the Netherlands to import hydropower from Norway during the day
and export back to Norway during the night, the time when there is excess capacity due to lower
consumption [31].
3.3.6. Thailand (Khlong Ngae)–Malaysia (Gurun)
Closer to Australia is an electricity interconnection linking two neighboring ASEAN countries
Malaysia and Thailand with an electricity exchange capacity of 300 MW through 110 km of 300 kV
HVDC cable, see Section 5. The system links Khlong Ngae (Thailand) and Gurun (Malaysia) as shown
in Figure 3. The interconnection is claimed to be “an important stepping-stone to the realization of
the ASEAN Power Grid which will significant enhance the greater energy security and economic
integration of the region” [32].
3.4. Regional Interconnections
The above overview of cross-border interconnections shows the practicality and value of
international electricity trade, and it should not be forgotten that mainland Europe and North America
also provide long-standing precedents that occurred through overwhelming benefits and shared
cultural identities. This section continues with more ambitious projects, one existing and two at an
advanced stage of proposal, clearly demonstrating that the super grid interconnection ‘dream’ has in
fact come true albeit still on a ‘scattered’ basis.
3.4.1. Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Interconnection Project
The interconnection of electricity grids of the six Gulf States shown in Figure 1 is an example of a
grid interconnection at a regional level involving longer planning time, higher cost, larger exchange
capacity, and more complex governance than those mentioned previously, yet realizable. The project
consists of more than of 20 years of planning and execution with the “green light” from the countries
involved in 1999 [33].
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To manage the project, the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) was
established in 2001. The project was implemented through 3 phases as follows:
• Phase 1—the GCC North Grid System linking four Gulf states: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain
and Qatar, completed in 2009. The cost of Phase I was around US$1.2 billion, shared by the
GCC governments.
• Phase 2—the GCC South Grid System linking UAE and Oman. I 2011 UAE was connected to the
system. In the implementation of Phase 2, the GCCIA was not involved.
• Phas —linking GCC North nd South Grids, the final stage of p ojec .
Table 3 shows the exchange capacities for each country taking part in the project.
Table 3. Size of interconnection to each Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) State [35].
System Size (MW)
Kuwait 1200
Saudi Arabia 1200
Bahrain 600
Qatar 750
UAE 900
LPG 5664
Oman 400
The cost of the Saudi Arabia HVDC substati w s over US$200 illion and the cost of the
substatio s of 5 other s ate was US$50 million each. The economic benefit of the GCC Interconnection
Project is summed up by the following statement made by Ahmed Ali Al-Ebrahim Director, System
Operations and Maintenance and Market Operation , GCCIA:
“The interconnector alone will s ve countries up to US$3 billion in capital inve tment by avoidi g
th need to build more than 5 GW of g neration capacity over 20 years. Operational nd fuel fficienc
savings acr ss the system will amount to at least US$300 million, based on feasibility estimates to 2028”.
I t
; (2) possible connection to the rest of the Mi dle East and North Afric , as well
as Europe.
above over iew on the intercon ections implemented at dom stic, sub-regional (cross-border),
and regi nal levels cl arly demon trate that this super grid interconnection ‘dr am’ has in fact co e
true, albeit still on a ‘scattered’ basis.
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3.4.2. Icelink
Considering the options for the UK to expand its renewable generation capacity, it may be
cheaper to access hydro and geothermal resources in Iceland than to build domestic offshore wind
generation [36]. The Icelink project to enable this exchange has been discussed for some years, and
submarine HVDC technology has now advanced to the point where it is feasible and economic,
with strong support from both countries. The interconnector would be 1200 km to the UK with
extensions to Norway, Germany, and the Netherlands, with a proposed exchange capacity of 1000 MW.
The anticipated date for commencing operation is 2025.
3.4.3. The EuroAsia Interconnector
The EuroAsia Interconnector is arguably more ambitious than Icelink, being a 500 kW HVDC link
1518 km long in total with initially 1000 MW and ultimately 2000 MW of exchange capacity, though
it can be approached in stages rather than as a single oceanic run. It is proposed for interconnecting
the Cypriot, Israeli and Greek transmission networks and the business case is strong under a variety
of potential future market conditions [37]. The Israeli and Greek power systems have similar total
capacity and annual generation, suggesting that they would be effective trading partners, with a
compatible impact on both their power systems and their economies.
The major technical challenge is the depth that must be traversed: up to 2300 m between Israel
and Cyprus and up to 2700 m between Cyprus and Crete. Such depths are significantly in excess
of the 1650 m noted above for the SAPEI link. Work has commenced to finalize the design of the
interconnector and to procure the associated works contracts. The first stage of construction is intended
to commence in 2018, and the second stage, the deepest part, in 2020. When complete, this project will
establish an excellent precedent for interconnection between Australia and Java, which must traverse a
similar length and depth to the EuroAsia link.
4. The ASEAN Power Grid
This Section is dedicated to the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) with a rather detailed treatment
for an obvious reason: the likelihood of an Asian—Australian Grid is very much intertwined with
the successful realization of the APG. Since ASEAN is Australia’s gateway to countries beyond the
Southeast Asian region, the development of APG is crucial to the future of Australasian grid. And on
the other hand, if through a first interconnection project, constructed on bilateral terms and justified in
its own right, Australia would be proven to be a secure, reliable and economic source of low-carbon
electricity, and this would be a strong motive for the rapid development of the APG and interconnection
beyond to Asia more generally. In this section, we will elaborate on the current and future energy
landscape for ASEAN, and discuss the progress and possibility of APG.
4.1. ASEAN Electricity Generation and Generation Capacity
ASEAN demand for energy will increase dramatically due to its low rate of access to energy, large
amount of traditional biomass usage and low level of energy usage. As a developing country block,
the Southeast Asian energy sector faces challenges that are typical of other developing countries. The
first high profile challenge is a lack of access to electricity. As of 2013, the total number of the ASEAN
population without electricity is about 120 million (out of its total population of 616 million). The
population without access to electricity is mainly from Indonesia (49 million), Myanmar (36 million),
the Philippines (21 million), and Cambodia (10 million). Only four countries, that is, Brunei Darussalam,
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, have electrification rates and urban electrification rates of about
100% [38]. In addition to a rural electrification, increase of supply of modern energy (compared with
traditional biomass) is also a challenge. Southeast Asia’s energy use per capita was just half of the
global average in 2011 [39].
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The power sector shapes the energy outlook for Southeast Asia as electricity demand almost
triples by 2040, with the shift towards coal set to continue. According to recent scenario [40], Southeast
Asia will produce 2200 TWh of electricity in 2040, nearly triple the 2013 production level of 789 TWh.
The share of fossil fuels (coal, gas and oil) in that scenario decreases from 82% to 77%, whilst renewable
shares increases from 18% to 22%, with hydro still being the main renewable energy (RE) producer
at 12%. Interestingly, coal still plays an important role in Southeast Asia electricity generation in
2040, with an increasing share of 50% from 32% in 2013. The report highlights the unusual path this
region is taking in terms of its increased coal contribution to the power generation. This is however
is not surprising, given the fact that coal is “cheap” and readily available in the region. The region’s
urgent need for electricity to keep up economic momentum outweighs environmental concerns. This
is despite the international financial institutions announcing in 2013 to “stop or limit funding for
coal-fired power plants” ([39], p. 40). The emergence of China as the key source of funding has helped
maintaining the attractiveness of coal-fired power plants.
In terms of generating capacity, Southeast Asia’s generation capacity will increase from 210 GW in
2014 to 550 GW in 2040, of which 150 GW comes from coal (Figure 2). To meet the increase in demand,
400 GW of power generation capacity—roughly equal to the combined installed capacity of Japan and
Korea today—is added across the region between today and 2040, of which 40% is coal-fired [39].
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An increasing use of fossil fuels, particularly coal, will lead to considerable increase in GHG
emissions, assuming that today’s technologies will be used. ASEAN’s energy-related CO2 emissions
have more than tripled since 1990 and are expected to almost triple again between 2013 and 2040. The
rapid growth in primary energy supply and the dominance of fossil fuels will result in a corresponding
2.7% annual growth in CO2 emissions from 1175 million tons (Mt) in 2013 to 2394 Mt in 2040 [39].
Compared with current estimates, the amount of expected additional CO2 emissions from ASEAN is
roughly equivalent to that of the world’s fourth highest emitter (Russia) and about 21.4% of emissions
of the world’s largest emitter—China—in 2010 data [40].
The above figures pose a paradox: on the one hand, ASEAN aspires to be ‘green’, on the other
hand, its outlook is brown and even dark. Utilization of low carbon energy sources, mainly renewables,
is the only way to resolve the contradictory need between growth needs and emission control [41].
4.2. ASEAN Resources Advantages
A core strength that ASEAN possesses as it seeks to move toward a cleaner, more sustainable
energy mix is that it has vast potential for the greater use of low-carbon primary energy sources. It has
been reported [42] that hydropower capacity in the five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) could be up to 234 GW. Another report suggest that hydropower
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from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, if well developed, may provide 18.9 gigawatts (GW) for China,
7.68 GW for Thailand, and 5.1 GW for Vietnam in 2025 [43]. As a reference, total installed electricity
generation capacity in 2015 was 1519 GW China, 41 GW for Thailand, and 40 GW for Vietnam [8].
The low percentage of potential hydropower resources that have been developed indicates that there
is significant potential to further greening the ASEAN energy mix [44].
ASEAN members also have the second (Indonesia) and third (the Philippines) largest geothermal
resources in the world. Indonesia was estimated to have over 27.5 GW, or about 40% of the world
total geothermal resources, which, however, was reportedly only developed 5% [45]. Yet despite this
overall significant potential low-carbon energy resources in ASEAN, there are not evenly distributed
across countries. This uneven distribution further limits each individual country’s choices in energy
supply and causes low levels of development for hydroelectricity. Much of the hydropower potential
in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, has not yet to be developed, even though large hydropower has
been demonstrated could be sustainable by Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in Laos [46].
The significant low emission resource potential in ASEAN provides a potential solution to achieve
ASEAN’s green aspiration [41] without comprising its economic growth. The looming and growing
supply-demand gap, and consequently growing import dependence, particularly for oil and natural
gas supplies41 could be partially mitigated by import of electricity through AAG. Such a regional
power trade could provide opportunities for meeting ASEAN’s energy demand and maintain its green
growth aspirations.
4.3. ASEAN Vision 2020 for Energy Interconnections
The APG is one of the main components of ASEAN Vision 2020 for Energy and Water
(www.asean.org) “to promote more efficient, economic, and secure operation of power systems
through harmonious development of national electricity networks in ASEAN by region-wide
interconnections” [47]. The feasibility of APG was carried out through the ASEAN Interconnection
Master Plan Study (AIMS) with the following considerations: (1) different load shape among ASEAN
countries; (2) energy resources sharing (generation/reserve capacity); (3) “less dependency on fuel
imports from non-ASEAN countries”; and (4) potential total cost savings from interconnection.
According to the first AIMS, the realization of APG would require investment of USD3687
million for interconnection. However, APG would be able to save ASEAN about USD4475 million on
generation costs, and reduce installed capacity by 2013 MW [48].
ASEAN made the first big push to develop a regional power grid in 1981 by setting up Heads
of ASEAN Power Utilities/Authorities (HAPUA). The establishment of HAPUA laid the foundation
for the formation of the 1982 ASEAN Cooperation Project on Interconnection. Since then, HAPUA
gradually firmed up the plan for the APG [49]. The eventual establishment of the APG was planned
in the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 1999–2004. By 1999, HAPUA had
identified 14 interconnection projects, including the existing interconnections of Thailand–Laos PDR
and Peninsular Malaysia–Singapore [50]. In the updated report of the ASEAN Interconnection Master
Plan Study (AIMS II) that was finalized in 2010, 16 interconnection systems were identified under the
APG program. The East Sabah (Malaysia)–East Kalimantan (Indonesia) interconnection system, and
the Sumatra–Singapore interconnection system are two new systems in the AIMS II. Meanwhile, the
Sarawak–Sabah–Brunei interconnection system was modified by dropping the Sabah–Brunei line.
Both AIMS and AIMS II divide the APG into three sub-systems [49], namely:
• Upper West System: located in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) (Cambodia, Laos PDR,
Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam).
• Lower West System: located in Thailand, Indonesia (Sumatra, Batam), Malaysia (Peninsular),
and Singapore.
• East System: locating in Brunei, Malaysia (Sabah, Sarawak), Indonesia (West Kalimantan), and
the Philippines.
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To realize the AGP, HAPUA have adopted a gradual and incremental strategy: power connections
will be initially bilateral, then gradually expand to a sub-regional basis and finally to a totally integrated
Southeast Asian power grid system (Table 4). In the current APG plan of activity, one of the priorities
is to realize multiple nation power trade [51].
Table 4. ASEAN Power Grid (APG) Interconnections (as of May 2017) [51,52].
No. Interconnection Earliest COD
1 Peninsular Malaysia–Singapore (Plenton-Woodlands) Existing
Peninsular Malaysia–Singapore (new) Post 2020
2 Thailand–Peninsular MalaysiaSadao-Bukit Keteri Existing
Khlong Ngae-Gurun Existing
Sungai Kolok–Rantau Panjang
Khlong Ngae–Gurun (2nd Phase, 300 MW)
tbc
tbc
3 Sarawak–Peninsular Malaysia 2025
4 * Peninsular Malaysia–Sumatra 2021
5 Batam–Singapore post 2020
6 Sarawak–West Kalimantan Existing
7 Philippines–Sabah tbc
8 Sarawak–Sabah–Brunei 2020
Sarawak–Sabah 2020
* Sabah–Brunei Not selected
Sarawak–Brunei 2019
9 Thailand–Lao PDR
Roi Et 2-Nam Theun 2 Existing
Sakon Nakhon 2–Thakhek–Then Hinboun (exp.) Existing
Mae Moh 3–Nan–Hong Sa Existing
Udon Thani 3–Nabong (converted to 500 kV) 2019
Ubon Ratchathani 3–Pakse–Xe Pian Xe Namnoy 2019
Khon Kaen 4–Loei 2–Xayaburi
Thailand–Lao PDR (new)
2019
2015–2023
10 Lao PDR–Vietnam 2016–2020
11 Thailand–Myanmar 2018–2026
12 Vietnam–Cambodia (new) 2020
13 * Lao PDR–Cambodia 2016
Ban Hat-Kampeng Sralao Existing
Ban Hat-Stung Treng Post 2018
14 Thailand–Cambodia (new) Post 2020
15 East Sabah–East Kalimantan tbc
16 Singapore–Sumatra Post 2020
Note: * priority connections. tbc: to be confirmed.
As of November 2016, there were nine cross-border links belonging to six out of 16 interconnection
systems in operation; six interconnections were ongoing and the rest of the 16 will be completed beyond
2020 [53].
Realizing the APG faces various challenges in technical, economical, financial and institutional
aspects, some of which are not readily solved in the near future. These institutional barriers such as
licensing requirements, the expropriation of assets, consumer protection and safety standards, are
unlikely to be solved in short period of time [53]. A lack of political trust among ASEAN countries will
also prevent a high interdependence of power grids [54].
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5. Australian–Asian Grid (Australasian Power Grid, AAG)
5.1. The Case
The case for the establishment of AAG comes from two seemingly ‘matching’ considerations, i.e.,
(a) Australia’s abundance of energy resources including renewable energy coupled with its technology
and expertise; and (b) Asian’s increasing demand for energy to keep up with its economic growth.
5.2. Benefits
In a 2013 workshop [55] a number of benefits of the existence of such an interconnection were
identified as follows: security of energy supplies for the region, reduction in energy conflicts, a
solution to climate change, a pathway to low carbon futures, maximize the regions’ natural advantage
of renewable resources, build regional partnerships, and make some headway to reducing energy
poverty in the region. These benefits are generally in line with benefits identified in the cases of
interconnections mentioned in Section 3 and with those found in [56]. There is also potential for
economic efficiency through integration. A model for 100% renewable energy supply in Southeast
Asia [57] found that a centralized interconnected scenario resulted in a lower overall levelized cost
of energy than a decentralized scenario comprising independent national grids. This was partly due
to the stabilization of the intermittency of renewable resources by integration over a large scale, and
partly due to the integration of additional demand of industrial gas and desalinated water to provide
flexible loads.
5.3. Existing Scenarios
Taggart et al.’s scenario [58], also called the Pan Asian Grid, aims at facilitating exchanges of
Renewable Energy based-electricity among several countries in North East Asia, ASEAN and Australia.
Table 5 shows renewable energy resources that can potentially harnessed and exchanged among these
countries under this scenario.
Table 5. Renewable Energy Potential in several countries in NE Asia, ASEAN and Australia [58].
Group Country Renewable Energy(RE) Resources
North East Asia
China wind, solar
Japan geothermal
ASEAN
Indonesia Geothermal
Philippines wind, geothermal
Mekong states hydro, biomass
In addition, the scenario also proposed the establishment of natural gas pipelines and fiber optic
cables that “could stretch from Australia to China, and possibly beyond into Central Asia and the
Russian Far East” [58].
Figure 3 shows two proposed routes for the Pan-Asian Energy Infrastructure scenario, i.e., one
route mostly by land and the other largely by sea.
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consideration/development: transmission path of the ISJ, Section 3.2.2 (a), existing: Thailand (Khlong
Ngae)—Malaysia (Gurun), Section 3.3.6 (b) and proposed (c,d) transmission links that could form an
Asian electricity grid.
Another scenario, known as the Asia Pacific Super Grid (Figure 3) aims at promoting large-scale
solar electricity exchange among countries involved. In this scenario, one third of the electricity is to
be provided from Australia’s solar through HVDC cable by 2050 “on the basis that it is substantial but
would still allow room for diverse electricity sources within each country to maintain robustness”. The
scenario relies upon short term pumped hydroelectric storage with significant capacity for maintaining
reliability including solar energy intermittency mitigation [59].
Examining the practical and commercial considerations for the first interconnection between
Australia and ASEAN, a recent study of the prospect for exporting solar energy from the Pilbara region
of Western Australia [60] presents a more focused scenario considering both the aggregation of solar
generation and the submarine interconnection to a landing point in East Java. The study finds that it
is technically feasible, though ambitious, to build this interconnection as a bipole HVDC submarine
transmission line with an exchange capacity of 3000 MW using present technologies. The selected
route is about 1500 km long and avoids the deepest parts of the Java trench, but still exceeds 2000 m
deep in multiple locations. The commercial case is considered premature at the present costs of solar
generation, battery energy storage, and HVDC transmission, but the first two of these are decreasing
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rapidly and, by the time such a complex project could be planned, approved, and developed, the
economic case is likely to be favorable.
The study also considered the strategic benefits to Indonesia that a “grid extension” to the Pilbara
may offer, emphasized the long process of sensitive engagement between Indonesia and Australia that
will be necessary to achieve the project, and assessed the impacts and opportunities for traditional
owners of the Pilbara’s prime solar generation land. And it may be that these factors, more than any
others, will determine whether the interconnector has a serious prospect.
5.4. A Brief History of the Australia–ASEAN Engagement
Realizing and managing the proposed AAG will be certainly a mammoth task and pose serious
challenges to the parties involved. However, experiences of (and lessons from) existing projects
elsewhere (see previous Sections) should provide some valuable information for implementing and
running this transnational energy business.
Within the region itself, there have been a number of cooperation or initiatives that can be
employed as templates to initiate the discussion on the feasibility of the AAG concept and should it be
deemed prospective, to endeavor for its realization.
The first historic meeting held in Canberra in 1974 between Australia and ASEAN marked the
beginning of cooperation that have transformed the two groups of countries into a mutual dynamic
partner. “Australia was ASEAN’s first dialogue partner—the first country ASEAN agreed to meet
on a regular basis to discuss political, economic and functional cooperation. The first formal talks
which brought together the then five members of ASEAN and Australia were held in Canberra in
1974.” [61]. The same observation was made by Ravenhil [62] and Severino [63] (Severino noted
that “The European Economic Community was actually the first of all Dialog Partners, but it was
not a country” (p. 310)). Through the ASEAN—Australia Economic Cooperation Program (AAECP),
Australia extended economic assistance to ASEAN regional projects [63], including assistance to
non-conventional energy research through the ASEAN Subcommittee on Nonconventional Energy
Research (ASEAN SCNCER), a subcommittee within the ASEAN Committee of Science and Technology
(ASEAN COST). The channeling of Australia’s technical assistance to the non-conventional energy
research is staged through Phase I through Phase III of the AAECP.
Australia was also the first country with which ASEAN established a formal consultative structure
on trade matters, called the ASEAN-Australia Consultative Meetings (AACM), in 1978 [63].
In another sign of strengthening relationship between ASEAN and Australia, the
ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program (AADCP) was established in 2002. The
six-year project costing $45 million aimed at strengthening: regional and social cooperation, regional
institutional capacities, science, technology and environmental cooperation, and expediting the new
ASEAN Member Countries’ integration into ASEAN [62,64].
The above and many other forums/meetings between Australia and ASEAN and others which
involve Australia as a partner are demonstration of the “closeness” of the communications between
the regional neighbors.
Within the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) document [65], one of the physical
connectivity listed is energy (Others include: transport and information and communications
technology (ICT)). The document also listed Australia as one among other ASEAN partners that
might potentially provide funding for technical assistance.
Australia’s sustained engagement with ASEAN has been attributed to “the economic
opportunities that Southeast Asia and the rest of East Asia present, by Southeast Asia’s strategic
location between Australia and the rest of Asia, and by ASEAN’s role as the hub of East Asian
regionalism” ([63], p. 310).
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6. Discussion
The challenges and issues facing the realization of the AAG will come from two fronts, i.e.,
(1) Australia as ‘the initiator’ of the concept; and (2) ASEAN/Asia who need to be convinced of the
worthiness of such an idea.
6.1. Australian Front
There has been policy inconsistency about advancing renewable energy in Australia. The repealing
of the carbon pricing scheme in Australia (also known as the carbon tax) and replacement with the
Emissions Reduction Fund on 17 July 2014 is a prime example of such inconsistency. The carbon-pricing
scheme was actually introduced on 1 July 2012 as the Clean Energy Act. Falling electricity demand due
to an increase in the retail price of electricity; declining industrial demand; reduced manufacturing
activity; energy efficiency initiatives; and solar PV systems is also concerning in the Australian context,
since this has led to investment lock, as installed capacity lie idle. The regulatory decision to allocate
investments based on increasing electricity demand when demand is actually falling is alarming in the
Australian context.
Australia is rich in carbon-based energy resources such as coal and gas, and to date these resources
have played an important role in the Australian economy. Any policy that undermines the role of fossil
fuels is politically unpopular because this has been connected with rising end-user consumer prices
despite there being multiple causes for rising prices—a topic beyond the scope of this paper. There
have been some divergent (contrasting) views as to the impact of favorable renewable energy policy
on the energy prices. Those who favor the high and quick penetration of RE argue that renewables
are capable of delivering the energy policy ‘trilemma’ under a fair price of carbon and adequate
capacity investments in regional interconnectors. On the other hand, advocates of fossil fuel consider
renewables to be intermittent in nature—at least until mature and affordable storage technologies
come into play—and costly, and hence they are unable to drive the affordability and security of
supply objectives.
The ability of the National Electricity Market (NEM) to deliver the energy policy trilemma of
secure supply of energy, affordability and sustainability is also questionable and is attracting increasing
attention from policymakers [66,67]. The turmoil in the wind-reliant state of South Australia (SA)
mirrors this view as a storm set off a catastrophic chain of events in September 2016 that resulted SA
in becoming an electrical island and isolated from the national grid, as the interconnector stopped
working, leading to a state-wide system blackout. The state is also facing an energy crisis since the
high peaks in energy usage do not always match up with the increasingly intermittent supply. As a
result, the state is considering a ‘go it alone’ policy to solve the energy crisis, which may result in its
breaching the National Electricity Rules, augmenting more uncertainty about the survival of the NEM
in its present form.
A recent report on optimizing Australia’s National Electricity Market, popularly known as the
Finkel Review [68], has advocated a technology neutral Clean Energy Target for the electricity sector
in transitioning to a more sustainable energy mix in order to meet the Paris targets for greenhouse-gas
emission reductions while maintaining energy security. The scope of clean energy is still under
discussion in the political arena at the time of writing, and includes not only renewable energy
production such as wind and solar but also nuclear energy, gas and coal production incorporating
carbon capture and storage technology, which—according to the Review—should play a particularly
important role as a transition resource. However, in the absence of a carbon price, the only investment
is expected to be in new large-scale renewables electricity generation, primarily wind and solar, and
in gas generators as flexible capacity. Addressing the tension in energy policy objectives tension
between de-carbonization and energy security largely remains unanswered and so are the financing
mechanisms for renewables.
Nevertheless, amid the political uncertainty, the public and many sectors of the business
community are generally favorable towards a transition to renewable energy sources and realize that
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such a transition is necessary. The opportunity to export renewable energy in the form of electricity,
hydrogen, or a hydrogen carrier such as methane or ammonia, is likely to generate much popular
interest, because it can create an alternative contribution to Australia’s GDP should fossil-fuel exports
be reduced due to policy or market developments domestic and abroad.
6.2. ASEAN/ASIAN Front
Indonesia’s Electrical Power Development Program does not even consider renewable energy
as important part of the energy mix, although there is an allowance for renewable generation and
for energy imports in the capacity expansion program presently underway. Indonesia’s National
Development Plan is guided by the Nine Priorities Agenda, Nawacita or Nawa Cita in Sanskrit, which
is: (1) Returning the state to its task of protecting all citizens and providing a safe environment;
(2) Developing clean, trusted, and democratic governance; (2) Developing Indonesia’s rural areas;
(4) Reforming law enforcement agendas; (5) Improving quality of life; (6) Increasing productivity and
competitiveness; (7) Promoting economic independence by developing domestic strategic sectors;
(8) Overhauling the character of the nation; (9) Strengthening the spirit of “unity in diversity” and
social reform [69].
Due to geographic reasons—which have an impact on economic, technical, and other related
issues—any future Australian engagement with intercontinental interconnection must be realized
through intensive engagement with ASEAN. Furthermore, due to its unique geographical position
in ASEAN and as Australian neighbor, Indonesia plays a crucial role in the realization of such a very
challenging endeavor.
No proposed interconnection scenarios have actually been properly taken into account for
how they can fit into the existing APG initiative, the crucial key for Australia to enter into this
intercontinental interconnection. As discussed in Section 4, the APG is a formal plan among ASEAN
countries through ASEAN Vision 2020 for Energy and Water. Any initiative—such as that described
in in Section 5.3—that is regarded as an alternative to the existing plan, will only be looked at more
closely and seriously by ASEAN if such an initiative looks very compelling. A sensitive approach to
international engagement is required to put a new proposal on the table.
ASEAN as a whole can, in theory, attain energy self-sufficiency status through energy exchanges
among themselves, whereby the countries with abundant low-carbon energy resources export the
energy to resource-poor countries in exchange for other economic commodities that bring mutual
benefits to countries involved. In such an ideal scenario, the question: “Will (South-East) Asian
nations be willing to import renewable energy from Australia?” [70] will be irrelevant. Only if and
when “domestic” exchanges among ASEAN are less economical or practicable than Australian energy
imports, will the latter be an attractive option to ASEAN and other groupings beyond ASEAN.
However, such an ideal scenario is as challenging as ever, due to various reasons reflected in the
progress of the APG implementation to date. Conflicting priorities for land use, complex approval
processes, and difficulties of project implementation mean that energy resources that are available in
principle cannot always be accessed in practice.
If one accepts the premise that the ASEAN through its APG is central to the realization of the
AAG, then it follows that finding solutions to issues currently being faced by the APG is also the key
to the realization of the AAG, whichever of the two scenarios would prevail. In other words, Australia
will need to be actively involved in the APG discussion.
The challenges in opening discussions with the APG however, may be not the immediate
question. The immediate question is how to connect Australia to one of the ASEAN countries,
which would clearly be Indonesia, to demonstrate technical and economic feasibility, and to provide a
track record of successful commercial operation. Before the AAG can be discussed by ASEAN, the
Australian-Indonesia connection needs to have a likely proposal so that ASEAN can take it seriously.
Even before ASEAN can make decision on AAG, the Indonesia-Australian interconnection could still
be progressed, as Indonesia itself is a future demand centre and can provide market for Australian
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electricity export. The Indonesian government set an unconditional reduction target of 29% of GHGs
against a BAU (business as usual) scenario by 2030 and an additional 12% reduction conditional on
technology transfer, capacity building, results for payment, and access to finance [71]. Indonesia’s
climate change mitigation measures in the energy sector include “at least 23% (primary energy) coming
from new and renewable energy by 2025” and gas was not mentioned in the INDC plan [72].
As long as Australian electricity is cost competitive in the Indonesian market, it will warrant
Indonesia’s attention. This past experience in electricity import has prepared Indonesia for further
import of electricity. Indonesia has been importing electricity solely from Malaysia since 2009.
The amount of import increased from 1.26 GWh in 2009 to 8.99 GWh in 2014 [72]. After a new
transmission line was put into operation on January 20, 2016, Indonesia has started importing more
electricity from Malaysia. Indonesia has gained significant cost savings from this power trade [73].
In 2012, the government issued a regulation on electricity exports and imports and allowed PLN to
import and export electricity from and to neighboring countries [73]. According to this regulation,
power imports will be allowed for regions with available power capacities of less than 30% of peak
demand, provided that there are no infringements on Indonesia’s sovereignty, security or economic
development [74]. Indonesia is also planning to export electricity to Malaysia within a few years [74].
7. Conclusions
The Australian–Asian Grid is technically viable, with technology that is proven and improving,
but economically, socially, politically, and administratively challenging. On the other hand, the seeds
of such an idea have been sown across Asia in the forms of several Asian sub-regional initiatives on
grid interconnections: ASEAN Power Grid, GobiTec, CASA-1000→ Asian Energy Highway.
This critical appraisal leads to the following two possible scenarios: (1) a pessimistic scenario
where such a concept will not eventuate or that it will eventuate beyond the foreseeable future and
(2) an optimistic scenario in which the idea will eventually be realized within the not-too-distant future.
Both scenarios come with attached conditions.
The pessimistic scenario points to the complexity of many aspects involved in realizing such an
initiative. Socio-economic and geopolitical circumstances of ASEAN/Asia which are in many ways in
contrast to Australia seem too overwhelming to deal with.
In the optimistic scenario, the Australian–Asian Grid is considered to be an evolutionary process,
starting with the realization of the above mentioned sub-regional interconnections and sealed with
the super-grid linking Australia with the above interconnections through ASEAN Power Grid (APG).
Energy scarcity, climate change concern, and technological advances will eventually push for the
realization of this concept. In this regard, Australia should engage more actively in various forums
for discussing such initiatives at ASEAN/Asian levels. Such a forum provides huge opportunities
for Australia to offer vision, technologies, expertise in renewable energy and climate change. Future
conceptualization of AAG entails the sound understanding of Australia’s neighbors’ priorities agendas,
such as Indonesia’s Nawacita [69].
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ISJ Interkoneksi Sumatera Jawa (Java-Sumatra Interconnetor)
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MPAC Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity
NEM National Electricity Market
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PLN Perusahaan Listrik Negara (Indonesian government owned electricity company)
SACOI Sardinia-Corsica-Italy
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SCNCER (ASEAN) Sub-Committee on Non Conventional Energy Research
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
UN United Nations
WEO World Energy Outlook
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